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any and all circumstances.37 As women's rights have increased, the
need for their protective blanket has diminished.-" However, there
still remains a tendency to give greater benefits to the mother in
alimony and child support decrees. It appears that the Moore
court devised its guidelines to help combat the possible inequitable
decisions that may have resulted. This may not be the panacea;
however, this result is a step toward uniformity of decisions and
is in line with the trend toward equilization of the rights of men
and women.
ROBERT Y. NAGATA
PAROLE- EXCLUSIONARY RULES- DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON
THE REHABILITATION OF PAROLEES NOT CONSIDERED IN HOLDING
THAT EXCLUSIONARY RULES HAVE No APPLICATION TO PAROLE
REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS. In re Martinez (Cal. App. 1969).
While released on parole, Martinez was arrested, charged
witb and found guilty of possession of heroin.' The Court of
Appeal, Second District, subsequently reversed the conviction' on
the grounds that the search involved was illegal and the statements
used against him were obtained without constitutional warning.
The petitioner's parole had previously been revoked, 3 after a
hearing at which he was present, on the following grounds: (1) The
conviction (which was subsequently reversed); (2) driving a motor
vehicle without consent of his parole agent; and (3) using alcoholic
liquors to excess. Martinez's applications for parole were annually
heard and denied; the Adult Authority4 took cognizance of the
37. 37 CAL. JUR. 2d, Parent and Child § 21 (1957); B. ARMSTRONG. CALIFORNIA
FAMILY LAW at 1098.
38. Women today have the ability to provide for themselves, thereby lessening the
need for the husband's support. See, M. TURNER, WOMEN AND WORK (1964).
I. The record discloses that petitioner is now confined in Folsom State Prison, On
May 12, 1955, petitioner was convicted in the Los Angeles Superior Court of violation of
section 11500 of the Health and Safety Code (sale of narcotics-heroin), sentenced and
committed to state prison. He had admitted a prior narcotics conviction. He was released
on parole on June 14, 1962. In February, 1963, he was arrested and charged with
possession of heroin. In October he was found guilty, sentenced to state prison and
committed to the California Department of Corrections, in whose custody he has
remained. In re Martinez, 275 Adv. Cal. App. 55, 57, 79 Cal. Rptr. 686, 687 (1969).
2. People v. Martinez, 232 Cal. App. 2d 796,43 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1965).
3. Petitioner's parole on the 1955 conviction was canceled November 15, 1963, and
formally revoked February 13, 1964. See note I supra.
4. Reference to the "Adult Authority" throughout this note refers specifically to
California's parole board.
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reversal of his conviction, but denied parole on the basis of his
parole behavior.
On July 23, 1969, the Court of Appeal, Third District, heard
the petitioner's writ of habeas corpus, alleging that cancellation
of parole and refusal to grant parole were the result of the
Authority's consideration of illegally obtained evidence and,
therefore, were not for cognizable cause. Held, writ denied: The
exclusionary rules, prohibiting use of evidence obtained as a result
of unconstitutional search and seizure and statements obtained
without constitutional warning, do not apply to proceedings to
determine the granting or revocation of parole. In re Martinez,
275 Adv. Cal. App. 55, 79 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1969).
Acknowledging that the Adult Authority had considered the
illegally obtained evidence,' the court first turned to In re Brown,6
involving a parolee's first degree robbery conviction, reversed for
the use of statements obtained without constitutional warning.
Brown held that although the Authority could not use the invalid
conviction as cause for parole revocation, reversal did not
foreclose further inquiry into the subject matter of the conviction.
"The Adult Authority may properly, under its own procedures,
determine whether defendant has engaged in conduct that
constitutes cause for parole revocation."
7
The Martinez court then relied on an earlier case,8 involving
a parolee who was acquitted of a charge of possession of a deadly
weapon, to the effect that an "acquittal was not binding on the
Adult Authority nor was evidence of the petitioner's innocence
... . [T]he Authority had the right to determine for itself the
acts upon which the criminal charge had been founded."9 The
court therefore concluded, a fortiori, that the Adult Authority had
fulfilled its obligation, upon the reversal of Martinez's conviction,
by reconsidering the facts surrounding his parole revocation.' A
question arises, however, as to the desirability of substituting the
5. 275 Adv. Cal. App. at 59, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
6. 67 Cal. 2d 339, 431 P.2d 630, 62 Cal. Rptr. 6 (1967).
7. Id. at 342,431 P.2d at 632, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
8. In re Anderson, 106 Cal. App. 2d 670, 237 P.2d 720 (1951).
9. 275 Adv. Cal. App. at 59, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
10. Id. The surrounding facts considered by the Adult Authority were the driving of
a motor vehicle and the use of alcoholic liquors; both, in the context of a conviction for
possession of heroin, appear de minimus.
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judgment of an administrative agency for a jury's fact finding
determination, or a court's verdict of not guilty.
Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to interfere with
penal or parole management; this philosophy of judicial
abstainance has been called the "hands-off" doctrine." This
doctrine silently underlies the court's reference to the Adult
Authority as having functions "entirely separate from that of the
police, prosecution, and the trial courts."' 2 While the Authority
may not suspend or revoke parole without cause,
courts may not interfere with decisions made by the Adult
Authority unless there has been error of law. . . . "[T]he
decision to grant or deny parole is committed entirely to the
judgment and discretion of the Adult Authority.'
' 3
This hands-off attitude has heretofore allowed the Adult
Authority to operate in a state of virtual autonomy.
Perhaps the most influential reason for affirming such broad
discretionary power is the Adult Authority's duty to protect the
public."
[A]pproximately one-half of all California parolees return to
prison within five years, either as the result of parole
revocation or a new felony commitment . . . . Criminal acts
by parolees evoke public resentment and criticism . . . . Close
supervision, surveillance and control not only minimize the
social risks inherent in parole, but safeguard the system for
those who make good .... 15
A premium is thus placed on the parole board's determination of
whether it is safe to leave a prisoner outside the prison walls.
Judges, generally, do not have the time, experience or background
to ascertain whether or not a particular individual should be
11. See 22 VAND. L. REV. 657 (1969); Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A
Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506
(1963).
12. 275 Adv. Cal. App. at 61, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
13. Id. at 58, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 687, quoting In re Schoengarth, 66 Cal. 2d 295, 300,
425 P.2d 200, 203, 57 Cal. Rptr. 600, 603 (1967) (emphasis added). Schoengarth,
unfortunately, upheld prison rules prohibiting inmates from assisting one another in the
preparation of legal documents.
14. 275 Adv. Cal. App. at 61, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
15. 275 Adv. Cal. App. at 63, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 690, quoting from People v.




returned to prison, so "parole legislation essentially involves a
delegation of sentencing power to the parole board.""6 Aside from
providing a substantial savings to taxpayers, parole offers the
means of field-testing the flow of prisoners back into society. 8
Parole is something of a contractual relationship in that the
parolee is deemed to have consented to the conditions and
restrictions imposed upon his release; thus, if a parolee reverts to
his former way of life he may be returned to the prison for further
treatment.'9
The state's interest in protecting society can best be achieved
through the rehabilitation of criminals. An enlightened parole
system should recognize that rehabilitation can be accomplished
through the creation of a parolee's mutual trust and respect for
the law; this goal could be facilitated through the parolee's
realization that his interests are being weighed equally with those
of the Adult Authority. Fundamental notions of fairness and
justice require the assurance that any factual basis concerning a
parolee's behavior will be arrived at fairly and accurately. As a
first step in this direction, therefore, the Federal statute r:equires
that a parolee "shall be given an opportunity to appear before the
Board . . . . 2 In Martinez, however, the court relied on existing
16. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 86 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE
REPORT].
17. To maintain an individual in prison costs California taxpayers over $2400 per
inmate per year. CORRECTIONAL PROGRESS IN CALIFORNIA, BIENNIAL REPORT, DEPT. OF
CORRECTIONS, 29 (1965-66) [hereinafter cited as PROGRESS REPORT]. The costs of
supervising a parolee may be estimated at around $650 per parolee per year. "No one who
pays taxes would realistically advocate that most convicted persons remain in prison for
the rest of their lives. The cost would be phenomenal." Milligan, Parole Revocation
Hearings in California and the Federal System, 4 CAL. WEST. L. REv. 18, 19 (1968).
Another commentator reached the conclusion that factors such as overcrowded prisons and
the cost of feeding and clothing the inmates renders economics "the primary consideration
underlying parole." Comment, Due Process and Revocation of Conditional Liberty, 12
WAYNE L. REv. 638, 640 (1966).
18. One of the most important reasons for parole is that more than ninety percent
of all prisoners are eventually released from prison. Milligan, supra note 17, at 19.
19. The "contract" theory, one of several theories of parole status to be hereinafter
mentioned, involves the assertion that a parolee accepts the condition of summary
revocation of his status at the time of the parole grant and that he thereby waives all claim
to his right to due process. See, In re Lorette, 126 Vt. 286, 228 A.2d 790 (1967). While
ironically recognizing that there is a right to due process which has been waived, this theory
is negated in that obviously the waiver is coercive and thus invalid. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court earlier stated that a parole grant is a matter of favor, not of contract.
Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1964). Under the federal statute an adult prisoner is eligible
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California law: "Although a parolee is not a prison inmate in the
physical sense, he is constructively a prisoner under legal custody
. . . and may be returned to the prison walls without notice and
hearing."2 1 If trust and respect for the law are accepted as
necessary to rehabilitation, the question arises whether a parolee
can be expected to trust a system which leaves him in the
precarious position of being returned to prison at any time
"without notice or hearing." Since a parolee's liberty, albeit a
conditional liberty, 22 is threatened by revocation of parole, he
should be afforded an opportunity to rebut accusations and
present mitigating circumstances, such as good character evidence
or the involuntariness of his breach.2 3 Furthermore, a parolee has
an interest in safeguarding his employment and any personal
for parole after serving one-third of his total sentence, or after 15 years if his sentence is
for more than 45 years or for life. 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1964).
21. 275 Adv. Cal. App. at 60, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 688, quoting from People v.
Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 149, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100, 104 (1964) (emphasis added).
See, CAL. PENAL CODE § 3060 (West 1956), stating that "[ihe written order of any
member of the Adult Authority shall be a sufficient warrant for any peace or prison officer
to return to actual custody any conditionally released or paroled prisoner." California
courts have heretofore concluded: "No statute requires that the Adult Authority . . . give
the prisoner notice or a hearing." People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 359, 398 P.2d 361,
375, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 183 (1965). Notice and hearing were required in California until
1941 under CAL. PENAL CODE § 1168(4) which has subsequently been recast into numerous
sections, none of which reinstated the requirement of notice and hearing. See CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 3060 (West 1956), 3020, as amended (\vest Supp. 1968); In re McLain, 55 Cal.
2d 78, 84-85, 357 P.2d 1080, 1084-85, 9 Cal. Rptr. 824, 828-29 (1960). Although no parole
revocation hearing is granted the parolee as a matter of right, the Authority does generally
grant such a hearing in practice. See PROGRESs REPORT, supra note 17, at 22; In re
Cleaver, 266 Adv. Cal. App. 148, 158-59, 72 Cal. Rptr. 20, at 27 (1968). "[A]ffording
parolees notice and hearing and a reasonable opportunity to rebut the charges against them
before final revocation of parole will not only discourage needless judicial review but will
impart a sense of fairness in the state's dealings with its parolees." In re Gomez, 64 Cal.
2d 591,594,414 P.2d 33, 35, 51 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99 n.1 (1966).
22. The conditions imposed on a parolee's release from prison ought to bear a
reasonable relation not only to the community's protection but to the success of the
parolee's rehabilitation as well. See, Comment, Freedom and Rehabilitation in Parole
Revocation Hearings. 72 YALE L.J. 368 (1962).
23. As recently stated, "[t]he question of whether notice and hearing are procedural
steps requisite to a constitutionally valid revocation of such conditional liberty produces a
clear-cut conflict of authority." Note, Control and Treatment of Narcotic Addicts: Civil
Commitment in California, 6 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 35, 46 (1969). State statutory provisions
relating to the procedural requirements necessary at parole revocation proceedings differ
widely. A majority of the states explicitly require a hearing. In a small number of
jurisdictions the legislatures have provided procedural safeguards such as confrontation,
cross-examination, and presence of counsel. Sklar, Law and Practice in Probation and
Parole Revocation Hearings, 55 J. CRIm. L.C. & P.S. 175 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Sklar].
19701 RECENT CASES
reputation he has regained in the community.24 Otherwise, the
parolee who believes that he did not receive fair treatment at the
hands of the law because the law is arbitrary and impervious to
facts, would become a more difficult subject for rehabilitation.25
The parolee's status of remaining "constructively a prisoner
under legal custody" illustrates the penal theory that parole is
merely an annex of the jail or a "prison without bars. 26 In
deciding Martinez, the court pointed out that "the prisoner, by
reason of his conviction has lost his civil rights . . . . [Parole is
a matter of grace and not of right. 'z7 Any rights which descend
to a parolee have thus been deemed to be "creatures of a statute,
not of constitutional directive. '2 The Court further noted that
"[a] parole hearing is not an adversary proceeding, and there is
no federally-protected right of counsel, or confrontation of
witnesses at such hearing. 29 Since a parolee has already "lost his
liberty and is subject to complete control and supervision of his
parole officer,"3 parole is not a matter of right, but is a mere
privilege.3
24. Note, Constitutional Law: Parole Status and the Privilege Concept, 1969 DuKE
L.J. 139, 146 [hereinafter cited as Parole Status].
25. See Note, Parole Revocation in the Federal System, 56 Co. L.J. 705, 723 (1968).
A convicted criminal not only is likely to be socially maladjusted; he is also likely to feel
that he has already been abused by.society. Such factors indicate the need for the parole
board's being careful not only to treat him fairly, but also in such a manner that he will
.recognize the fairness of his treatment. See Baine v. Bechstead, 10 Utah 2d 4, 9-10, 347
P.2d 554, 559 (1959) (probation); Sklar, supra note 23.
26. As one court observed: "The parole system, as an enlightened penological
technique, enables the parolee to pay his debt to society in a prison without bars. But he
continues at all times to remain in penal custody . . . .Parole has simply pushed back
the prison walls for him, allowing him wide mobility and greater personal opportunity
while serving his sentence." People v. Denne, 141 Cal. App. 2d 499, 508, 297 P.2d 451,457
(1956) (emphasis added).
27. 275 Adv. Cal. App. at 61, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 689 (emphasis added). A prison
sentence "suspends all the civil rights of the person so sentenced." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 2600 (West 1956). See also People v. Ray, 181 Cal. App. 2d 64, 69, 5 Cal. Rptr. 113,
115 (1960), in which the appellant vehemently attacked the constitutionality of the
indeterminate sentence system and the Adult Authority.
28. 275 Adv. Cal. App. at 59, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 688. See Dunn v. California Dept. of
Corrections, 401 F.2d 340, 342 (9th Cir. 1968).
29. Id. See also Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied 375
U.S. 957 (1963).
30. 275 Adv. Cal. App. at 62, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 690. This theory rests upon a dual
foundation: First, that the parolee was originally deprived of his liberty according to due
process of law; second, that the state has complete freedom to require a prisoner so
convicted to remain in prison for the length of the term set by the sentencing judge. See,
e.g., Sklar, supra note 23, at 193.
31. See, e.g.. People v. Denna, 243 N.Y.S.2d 797, 40 Misc. 2d 717 (1963), holding
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The traditional "privilege" view, relied upon in Martinez, is
being gradually eroded by the present trend toward an expanding
interpretation and realization of fourth, fifth, and sixth
amendment rights. The judicial philosophy underlying this trend
recognizes that prisoners retain certain civil and constitutional
rights. The "retained right" doctrine32 implies that a "prisoner
retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly
or by necessary implication, taken from him by law. 3 3 Thus,
prisoners have obtained court review of claims alleging abuse or
denial of their rights to religious freedom, 34 essential medical
treatment, 3 and access to the courts for redressing legal wrongs."
that information alleged to have emanated from an illegal search and seizure was not used
by parole officers to convict the petitioner of a crime, but merely to recall a privilege. No
constitutional right, was invaded by the parole board. Accord. Eason v. Dickson, 390 F.2d
585 (9th Cir. 1968); Williams v. Patterson 389 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1968); Rose v. Haskins,
388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1968). A majority of jurisdictions still view parole as being entirely
regulated by statute, and therefore invoke the privilege-right distinction to counter all
claims to procedural due process. Parole Status, supra note 24, at 140 n.6. The initial
erosion of the privilege-right distinction appears to have been in those areas in which the
grant of the benefit or status was conditioned upon the grantee's agreement to abstain from
the exercise of some right protected by an express clause in the Constitution. See Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). A further method of circumventing the privilege-righ
distinction has been through the equal protection clause. Regulations limiting eligibility for
a "privilege" to that class of persons willing to conform to "unreasonable" rules of
conduct have been consistently struck down as arbitrary and discriminatory and therefore
in violation of the fourteenth amendment. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963);
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Finally, and most importantly, certain
decisions indicate that the distinction may be circumvented by relying on an independent
right to procedural due process which requires at least minimum procedural standards
(such as a hearing) to help assure that a condition of the "privilege" has in fact been
violated. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Privilege-Right Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
32. See 22 VAND. L. REv. 57, 658 (1969). Running counter to the absolute "hands
off" attitude suggested in Martinez, are decisions such as Lee v. Washington, 263 F. Supp.
327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), affd per curiam, 390 U.S. 333 (1968), in which the court declared
"[lit is well established that prisoners do not lose all their constitutional rights and that
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment follow them
into prison and protect them there from unconstitutional action on the part of prison
authorities carried out under color of state law." Id. at 33 1.
33. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944). Accord, Talley v. Stephens,
247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965) (equal protection and due process available despite loss
of other rights and privileges).
34. E.g., Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (religious beliefs cannot be basis for
denying prisoner right to purchase certain religious publications and for denying him
privileges granted to other prisoners); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C.
1962) (prisoner has absolute right to religious belief of his choice).
35. E.g., Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1966); United States v. Ragen,
337 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1964).
36. In Smartt v. Avery, 370 F.2d 788 (6th Cir. 1967), the court struck down a prison
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In Mempa v. Rhay37 the Supreme Court held that a convicted
criminal has a right to counsel at a proceeding for revocation of
probation. There is a vital "necessity for the aid of counsel in
marshaling the -facts, introducing evidence of mitigating
circumstances, and in general aiding and assisting the defendant
to present his case as to sentence . . ,,38 Both parole and
probation revocation proceedings threaten a basic personal
interest in freedom. Since parole essentially involves a delegation
of the sentencing processes, the Mempa rationale appears equally
applicable to parolees and parole revocation proceedings.39
A recent federal court case, Campbell v. Pate,0 involving the
postponement of a prisoner's parole because of the discovery of a
powdered milk drink alleged to be contraband in his cell, held that
relevant facts "must not be so capriciously or unreliably
determined that, in effect, the inmate is deprived of equal
protection of the laws."4 If the fourteenth amendment reaches
even those prisoners still incarcerated, the question arises whether
a parolee, still a "prisoner under constructive custody," can
possibly have fewer legal rights than his former cellmate. A
parolee, a fortiori, is entitled to have facts concerning his behavior
fairly and accurately determined; when such a procedure is denied,
his complaint constitutes a justiciable cause.1
2
regulation which permitted a onb year delay in parole consideration for inmates who
sought relief through a writ of habeas corpus and were denied relief.
37. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
38. Id. at 135.
39. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 16, at 88; Parole Status, supra note 24, at
147.
40. 401 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1968) (petitioner Campbell is an inmate at the Illinois State
Penitentiary).
41. Id. at 57. Further evidence of arbitrary action was found in the prison staff having
first informed Campbell that his parole would be considered in 1968 and later changing
the date to 1969.
42. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement recently reported its similar
conclusion:
The offender threatened with revocatibn should therefore be entitled to a
hearing comparable to the nature and importance of the issue being decided.
Where there is some dispute as to whether he violated the conditions of his
release, the hearing should contain the basic elements of due process-those
elements which are designed to ensure accurate fact finding . . . [it should
include] such essential rights as reasonable notice of the charges, the right to
present evidence and witnesses, the right to representation by
counsel-including the right to appoint counsel-and the right to confront and
cross-examine opposing witnesses.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 16, at 88 (emphasis added).
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The Martinez court relied, inter alia, upon People v.
Hernandez,43 also involving a heroin possession conviction, which
held that "the requirement of reasonable or probable cause does
not apply to [the] search of a paroled prisoner when conducted
by his parole supervisors."" Unfortunately the parolee, a
convicted criminal, does represent a potential harm to the
community. Hernandez, therefore, concluded that
the authorities may subject him, his home and his effects to
such constant or occasional inspection and search as may seem
advisable to them . . . . If this constitutional fact strips him
of constitutional protection against invasions of privacy by his
parole officer, the answer is that he has at least as much
protection as he had within the prison walls."
The Martinez application of this prison without bars
illustration to searches by police officers," however, overlooks the
consideration that a parolee is likely to interpret unreasonable
searches of his person and effects as police harassment. Continual
searches may also provoke the irascibility of parolees who have
not yet socially adjusted to the requirements of close
communication with parole officers. Persons on probation are
protected from unreasonable searches by the fourth amendment. 4
Recent cases have likewise afforded the parolee fourth amendment
protection,4" indicating that a parolee has the same personal
interest in freedom from entirely unwarranted interference with his
enjoyment of privacy. Some respect for his interest, albeit limited,
would be conducive to developing the parolee's reciprocal respect
for the law. The imposition of a criterion of "slight cause" for
43. 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1964), cert. denied381 U.S. 953 (1965).
44. Id. at 150-51, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
45. Id. at 150,40 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
46. The court concluded that "[ifn view of the foregoing restrictions on the rights
of a parolee, we see no reason why the exclusionary rules should apply to the determination
of whether he has violated the terms of his parole, even though the violation of exclusionary
rules is done by police rather than parole officers."
275 Adv. Cal. App. at 60, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
47. Martin v. United States, 183 F.2d 436, 439 (4th Cir. 1950).
48. A parolee is not without basic constitutional rights. United States v. Hallman,
365 F.2d 289, 291 (3rd Cir. 1966). A parolee is entitled to constitutional protection from
illegal search and seizure. Brown v. Keraney, 355 F.2d 199, 200 (5th Cir. 1966). See also
People v. Belvin, 275 Adv. Cal. App. 1073, 80 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1969); United States v.
Lewis, 274 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Each of these cases dealt with criminal




searching a parolee, as contrasted to the court's implication of
"no cause," therefore, might better achieve the state's interest in
rehabilitation, thus eventually eliminating the potential harm from
which the public seeks protection.
In deciding Martinez, the court acknowledged that a fair
statement of the parole proceedings indicated that, in addition to
considering the other facts relating to the petitioner's arrest, the
Adult Authority had considered the evidence obtained by an
illegal search and the statements obtained without constitutional
warning.49 After noting that the exclusionary rule's purpose has
been held to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches by removing the
incentive to disregard it, 0 the court emphasized the separate
nature of the Adult Authority's functions from those of the police
and concluded: "To apply the exclusionary rules to parole
hearings would not necessarily implement the deterrent policy."5
An illegal search of a parolee's person, home or car by a police
officer does not relieve the parolee of any criminal responsibility.
The court therefore decided that although the evidence may not
be used against him in a criminal prosecution, no good reason
exists why it may not be used by a parole officer.
52
The suggestion that police officers might knowingly violate the
law to gain evidence inadmissible in a criminal proceeding in
order to turn it over to the Adult Authority to be used for
parole revocation, is an extremely remote possibility. If a
police officer learns of the violation of law by a parolee, such
officer is as anxious, if not more so, of providing legal evidence
for a conviction of the crime, as of assisting in the revocation
of parole.5
This reasoning appears fallacious.
Police officers are not only influenced by exclusionary rules,
but more importantly, by a feeling of duty to protect the public
by apprehending criminals. Police officers are also individuals,
influenced by subjective likes and dislikes; they are not necessarily
49. 275 Adv. Cal. App. at 59, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
50. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
51. 275 Adv. Cal. App. at 61, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 689 (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 62, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 689-90.
53. Id., 79 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
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devoid of prejudice.54 Psychologically, some element of antipathy
towards former criminals is not an "extremely remote
possibility," nor is a police officer's subsequent cooperation with
parole officers. Where it is difficult to obtain evidence legally, then
other evidence, which will nevertheless be considered by a parole
board, suffices to accomplish the same result. The public will be
protected, albeit through illegally obtained evidence, and a
criminal will be returned to prison; the exclusionary rule's
deterrent effect will be entirely circumvented.
The denial of exclusionary rules to parole hearings results in
another unfortunate consequence. The court, by affirming the
Adult Authority's use of the evidence in parole procedures, is in
effect ratifying its illegal acquisition.55 Since a parolee is expected
to learn to respect and obey the law, the situation becomes similar
to requesting him to refrain from illegal activity while his parole
officer simultaneously enjoys the fruits of other illegal activities.
A parolee can not easily be expected to trust or respect a system
which picks and chooses who is to be penalized for disobeying the
law.
In contrast, a very cogent reason for denial of the application
of the exclusionary rules in Martinez is the court's statement that:
Even though police officers might produce evidence
inadmissible in a criminal prosecution, it is necessary that such
evidence be available to the parole board in determining
whether it would be safe to leave an admitted law violator
outside the prison walls. 6
Serious parole violations constituting criminal acts not only
1 54. The Supreme Court in an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Warren recently
acknowledged this problem.
Regardless of how effective the [exclusionary] rule may be where obtaining con-
victions is an importan.t objective of the police, it is powerless to deter invasions
of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest in
prosecuting or are willing to forego successful prosecution in the interest of
serving some other goal. . . . The wholesale harassment by certain elements
of the police community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes,
frequently complain, will not be stopped by the exclusion of any evidence from
any criminal trial.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1968) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
55. As found by Terry: "A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial, we recognize,
has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence, while an
application of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional imprimatur." Id. at 13.




threaten the community's citizens, evoking public criticism of the
parole authorities,5 7 but may also threaten the community's
pocket book."8 The Adult Authority must be cognizant of a
parolee's criminal activities, such as Martinez's possession of
heroin, before any reflective decision may be reached concerning
his parole revocation. If evidence is withheld from the Authority
because of unconstitutional search and seizure, the public will
remain a victim of continued criminal activity.59
One of the court's primary considerations in Martinez was
that "IT]he administration of the parole system must be realistic,
and not strangled in technical niceties;"6 otherwise, "there would
be a deterrent effect on the granting of parole . -"1 The court
stated:
The Adult Authority now admits to parole prisoners who
perhaps appear on the borderline as to their ability to behave
in the outside world because the Authority has great discretion
in returning them to prison . . . If, however, returning them
is to be hidebound with technicalities . . . , granting of parole
will be greatly restricted and discouraged.12
In carrying this argument to its logical conclusion, the court noted
that the parole system would become impractical and would have
to be abandoned. The parolee's release from prison would be
substantially equivalent to the discharge of his sentence. "[T]he
prison authorities would be required, in a hearing before a judge,
with all the concomitants of a non-jury criminal trial, to justify
their resumption of in-prison custody ....
57. Id. at 63, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
58. Wasserstein v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 225, 288 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1968), recently held
the State of New York liable in tort for the failure to expeditiously pick up a known parole
violator for whom a warrant had been issued for absence from home and school. The
State's negligence was determined to be the proximate cause of a subsequent shooting
which resulted in the loss of the plaintiff's eyesight.
59. The Supreme Court conceded that "a rigid and unthinking application of the
exclusionary rule, in futile protest against practices which it can never be used effectively
to control, may exact a high toll in human injury and efforts to prevent crime." Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968). The "practices" referred to are those of "wholesale
harassment by certain elements of the police community." See note 54 supra.
60. 275 Adv. Cal. App. at 62, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 690, quoting from People v. Denne,
141 Cal. App. 2d 499, 510, 297 P.2d 451,458 (1956) (emphasis added).
61. 275 Adv. Cal. App. at 61, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 65, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 692, quoting from Williams v. Dunbar, 377 F.2d 505,
506 (9th Cir. 1967).
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Martinez further described the parole hearing as an
"informal setting,"64 which is "not an adversary proceeding."6
In the analogous area of juvenile courts, however, the Supreme
Court recently rejected a similar argument that juvenile
proceedings are non-adversary and recognized that adverse
interests may in fact lurk beneath the parens patriae surface. 6
While acknowledging the need for judicial deference to
administrative expertise, 7 In re Gault nevertheless condemned the
"unbridled discretion" of juvenile courts. Since an individual's
freedom was dependent upon the fact-finding proceeding, due
process was found to require notice of the charges, representation
by counsel, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and
sufficient specificity of findings. 8 In a second analogous area of
administrative proceedings, the commitment of narcotic addicts to
the Department of Corrections for placement at the California
Rehabilitation Center, the Martinez court distinguished People v.
Moore.9 Although that case was discarded on the qustionable
premise that while "[n]arcotic addict proceedings involve a loss
of liberty,"7 a parolee, by reason of his conviction, "has already
lost his liberty,"'" it is significant for its holding that narcotic
proceedings, "although technically classified as civil proceedings,
must be considered criminal proceedings for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. 712 Evidence obtained in violation of the rule
against unlawful search and seizures was therefore excluded. 3 A
parolee shares one thing in common with a probationer, juvenile,
or narcotic addict: His relative freedom of choice and action is
64. 275 Adv. Cal. App. at 59, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 688. "Information may be considered
by the parole board in an informal setting without strict observance of technical rules of
evidence." Id. See Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
65. 275 Adv. Cal. App. at 59, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 688. See Dunn v. California, 401 F.2d
at 342; Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d at 238.
66. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The argument expressed in Hyser v. Reed, 318
F.2e at 238, that the parole commission acts as parens patriae of the parolee and that
therefore the protections of due process are unnecessary, seems by analogy to have been
entirely undercut.
67. 387 U.S. at 25-26.
68. Id. at31-58.
69. 69 Cal. 2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1968).
70. Id. at 79, 446 P.2d at 805, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
71. The court stated: "Parole proceedings determine where he has to undergo that
loss of liberty, in prison or without. If without, his liberty is nevertheless restrained." 275
Adv. Cal. App. at 66, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 692.
72. 69 Cal. 2d at 680, 446 P.2d at 804, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
73. Id. at 682, 446 P.2d at 806, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
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substantially curtailed by incarceration or any other form of
involuntary isolation from whatever joy or sorrow society
furnishes. Realistically speaking, a parolee's liberty is dependent
upon the fact finding process, whether it be labeled "informal,"
"adversary," "criminal" or "administrative."
A penumbra of the prison without bars philosophy surrounds
the Martinez holding that the exclusionary rules, prohibiting the
use of evidence obtained from unconstitutional searches and
seizures and statements obtained without constitutional warning,
have no place in parole hearings. The court found comfort in the
practical presumption that "[i]t is extremely doubtful, also, if
there ever was a convict who spent any time in a prison who needs
to be told that any statement he might make could be used against
him." ' 74 Since a parolee "is not entitled to representation by
counsel, in such matters, nothing need be said to him about a
lawyer." 7 5 In this conclusion, however, and inter alia, the
conclusions that a parolee has been stripped of his civil rights,
assumes the risk of being subjected to continual searches and may
be returned to prison at any time without notice and hearing,76 the
court strays entirely too far from basic notions of fundamental
fairness and justice. The Adult Authority's interest in expediency
of case disposition, without the hinderance of "technical niceties,"
must be balanced against the parolee's interest in receiving
minimal due process.
77
The truth and accuracy of any factual determination
concerning a parolee's behavior must be assured, even at the risk
of imposing certain procedural safeguards upon otherwise
autonomous administrative proceedings. A parolee has certain
rights, not the least of which is an interest in enjoying his
conditional liberty or freedom from the prison walls, at least to
the extent that the potential harm he represents to the community
74. 275 Adv. Cal. App. at 67, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 692-93.
75. Id. at 66-67, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 692.
76. Id. at 60, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
77. One writer has suggested that in order that procedural safeguards are not rendered
illusory, the parole board should be required to establish the "factual basis for revocation
by something akin to the 'preponderance of evidence' rule" in civil cases. Cohen, Legal
Norms in Corrections 72 (unpublished study submitted to the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967). Note, Parole Revocation in the
Federal System, 56 GEo. L.J. 705, 739 (1968). See also TASK FORCE REPORT, note 42
supra (concluding that a hearing should contain the basic elements of due process); cf
cases cited in note 48 supra.
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remains only potential. Respect for these rights will encourage the
parolee's reciprocal trust and respect for the law, thereby
facilitating the state's interest in the achievement of rehabilitation.
Exactly where the delineation of procedures necessary to protect
the parolee's rights should be made remains a question of due
process, an ephemeral concept.78 The current trend toward
realization of fundamental rights through due process, however,
is permeating even those proceedings cloaked in administrative
cover; fortunately, the days of Martinez are numbered.
MICHAEL V. MILLS
TAXATION- FEDERAL INCOME TAX- EXCLUSION OF
SCHOLARSHIP AND FELLOWSHIP GRANTS FROM GROSS INCOME
HELD NOT TO APPLY TO GRANTS FOR WHICH A SUBSTANTIAL
QUID PRO QUO WAS EXTRACTED FROM THE RECIPIENT. Bingler v.
Johnson (U.S. 1969).
The Westinghouse Electric Corporation, under a jointly
funded program with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC),
allowed certain employees educational leave of absence to pursue
formal education. Johnson' availed himself of this program and
studied, full time, for his doctoral degree. During the period he
was on leave he was paid a stipend by Westinghouse, which,
depending on certain factors, was 70 to 90 percent of the former
salary. Westinghouse treated these payments as indirect labor
costs and withheld federal income tax. Johnson retained all of his
employee benefits and seniority. Before commencing the
educational leave he was required to sign a contract agreeing to
return to the employ of Westinghouse. 2 In addition, Johnson was
required to make periodic progress reports to Westinghouse and
to submit his thesis topic to Westinghouse and the AEC for
approval.
Johnson brought suit claiming a refund of federal income
taxes withheld while he was attending school, contending that
78. See e.g., Gideon v. Wainwripht, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
I. The respondents consisted of Johnson and two co-workers who will hereinafter be
referred to as Johnson.
2. Respondent Wolfe did not sign a contract, but he was advised that he was expected
to return to Westinghouse. He honored the obligation. Bingler v. Johnson, 89 S.Ct. 1439,
1441 n.7 (1969).
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